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Cognitive and Psychodynamic Mechanisms of Change
in Treated and Untreated Depression
m

Daniel Coleman, Diane Cole, and Leslie Wuest
Portland State University
Two patient-level mechanisms of change, defenses, and cognition
were tested over 3 time points in 65 depressed adults, approximately
half receiving treatment. Early changes in automatic thoughts and
immature defenses were associated with symptom change from
time-one to time-three. The directionality of early automatic thought
change predicting symptom change was partially supported, but
immature defense change occurs simultaneously with, or after,
symptom change. Given the convergent evidence of cognitive change
as a mediator of depression reduction, all depression therapies should
consider how they address depressive cognition. To build a more
complete understanding of how to ameliorate depression, future
studies should continue to include constructs from multiple theories
and have measures of therapy process in addition to patient level
mechanisms. & 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Clin Psychol
66 :215–228, 2010.
Keywords: cognitive therapy; psychodynamic therapy; mechanisms
of change; depression

Two central psychological constructs to understand the psychopathology and
treatment of depression are the cognitive-behavioral and psychodynamic perspectives. One type of evidence for a model of psychopathology is the efﬁcacy and
effectiveness of treatment based on that model. Cognitive therapy is well-established
as an effective treatment of depression according to several systematic reviews of the
literature (Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Roth & Fonagy, 2005). Psychodynamic
therapy is rated as ‘‘probably efﬁcacious,’’ with fewer controlled clinical trials and an
absence of replication using the same manual by different research groups
(Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Abbass, Hancock, Henderson, & Kisely, 2006).
One of the next challenges to psychotherapy research is identifying the
mechanisms of change, or active ingredients, of effective treatments. At the patient
level, mechanism of change research means identifying and studying psychopathological mechanisms that drive symptom change. This study examines two theorized
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mechanisms of change (cognition and defenses) and has multiple measurement
points to allow testing of temporal order of mechanisms and outcomes.

Theoretical Framework
This study is based in a critical realist epistemology that understands the cognitive
and the psychodynamic models as empirically reﬁned maps of depression and its
treatment (Wakeﬁeld, 1995). The psychodynamic and cognitive explanatory models
each illuminate dimensions of psychopathology and treatment, and each developed
in traditions of research with little reference to the other. When two explanatory
models cover the same territory, it is good science to construct research that
examines simultaneously constructs from both traditions. It is possible that more
powerful empirically based explanatory models will result from integrative research.

Cognitive Theory and Research
In the tradition of cognitive therapy led by Aaron Beck, a hierarchy of depressogenic
cognition is proposed: In-the-moment automatic thoughts can be grouped into
patterns of dysfunctional attitudes. Both automatic thoughts and dysfunctional
attitudes stem from less directly accessible core beliefs or cognitive schemas.
Although cognitive therapy, such as Beck’s, includes behavioral interventions, it is
held that these interventions work through their effect on changing cognitions (Beck,
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck, 1995). Although the theory proposes that
depression is rooted in the underlying core belief or cognitive schema, the depressive
cognition can be treated or measured only through the observable automatic
thoughts and dysfunctional attitudes (Garratt, Ingram, Rand, & Sawalani, 2007).
A series of studies demonstrate that changes in automatic thoughts or
dysfunctional attitudes predict decreased depression. DeRubeis and co-authors
(1990) showed that reduction in depression late in treatment was predicted by early
change in dysfunctional attitudes but not by automatic thoughts. Kwon and Oei
(2003) found that changes in automatic thoughts predicted decreased symptoms, and
changes in dysfunctional attitudes had a mediated effect on decreased symptoms
through changes in automatic thoughts. Furlong and Oei (2002) demonstrated that
change in dysfunctional attitudes was a better predictor than automatic thoughts of
reduced depression at termination. In a community mental health sample, Coleman
(2005) showed that changes in automatic thoughts were associated with symptom
change. Large effect sizes were found in these four studies for the relationship of
cognitive change to symptom change.
However, cognition has not consistently proved to be a speciﬁc change mechanism
of cognitive therapy, with change in cognition associated with symptom change in
treatments other than cognitive therapy (Oei & Free, 1995; Whisman, 1999). Garratt
et al. (2007) argue that cognitive therapy to pharmacotherapy comparisons provide
the best test of speciﬁcity, as all psychosocial comparison treatments inevitably
directly or indirectly address cognition. Their review found that the majority of
studies found similar cognitive change in pharmacotherapy as in cognitive therapy.
This result is consistent with an assumption of this study: that depressive cognition is
nearly universal in depressed participants and reduction in depressive cognition is
likely to be associated with reduced depression.
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Psychodynamic Theory and Research
In comparison to cognitive theory and research on mechanisms of change,
psychodynamic theory is less precise about mechanisms of change, and fewer
psychodynamic studies include tests of theory-based change mechanisms. There is a
long tradition of psychodynamic theorizing about ‘‘therapeutic action,’’ and recent
psychodynamic theorists have begun to address mechanisms of change in research
ﬁndings (Gabbard & Westen, 2003; Jones, 2000).
The psychodynamic theoretical frame in this investigation centers on an egopsychological perspective that views overall developmental level of defenses and
adaptive ﬁt of defensive functioning as intrapsychic processes that contribute to
mental health symptoms. Psychological health is found in ﬂexible use of defenses,
with predominant use of mature defenses and relatively little use of immature
defenses (McWilliams, 1994). The psychotherapy relationship itself, through
processes of identiﬁcation and internalization, stimulates use of more mature
defenses, as well as insight generated through interpretative techniques causing a
shift to more adaptive defenses (Gabbard, 1994; Gabbard & Westen, 2003).
Extensive theoretical discussions of the role of the ego and defenses to therapeutic
action can be found in Busch (1995) and Gray (1990).
Most empirical research on defenses and symptoms have not formulated changes
in defenses as a mechanism of change, more commonly simply observing the
correlation of changes in defenses and symptoms. Two studies using a patient selfreport measure of defenses found robust changes in defenses over the course of
treatment that were moderately to strongly associated with reduced symptoms
(Akkerman, Carr, & Lewin, 1992; Albucher, Abelson, & Nesse, 1998). Bond and
Perry (2004) found a similar pattern in long-term psychodynamic therapy, with
medium size change in overall defense style that was correlated with symptom
change. In Coleman (2005), changes in immature defenses, but not mature defenses,
were associated with symptom reduction across two time points in treatment with
medium size effects.
Research using projective testing to assess defenses also demonstrated substantial
change in defenses across treatment that were associated with outcome (Cramer &
Blatt, 1990). One study that used a therapist rating of defenses found that changes in
defenses did not predict symptom change, and that the majority of symptom change
came earlier in the treatment than defense change (Hersoug, Sexton, & Hoglend, 2002).
Relationship of Cognition and Defenses
Only one study was found that examined the relationship of changes in cognitions
and defenses. As previously noted, Coleman (2005) demonstrated that decreases in
both automatic thoughts and immature defenses were associated with decreased
symptoms. Across two time points in treatment, there was a non-signiﬁcant trend
level correlation of decreases in automatic thoughts with decreases in immature
defenses (r 5 .33, p 5 .06).
In addition to empirical evidence, the relationship of defenses and cognition can
be explored theoretically. A defense may be conﬁgured by several cognitive patterns
working in concert. However, it could be argued that defenses are more about
emotional processes than cognitions. Because defenses are at least partially
unconscious, they may more resemble deeper cognitive structures such as
dysfunctional attitudes, or ‘‘core beliefs’’ (Beck, 1995), than they do the consciously
accessible automatic thoughts (Coleman, 2005).
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The psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral perspectives each rank defenses and
cognitions by adaptiveness, ‘‘cost’’ to the patient, and distortion of reality. Both
psychodynamic and cognitive therapies hope to assist patients to develop more
adaptive mechanisms that are better attuned to reality and incur low costs or even
beneﬁts to the patient. The theoretical convergence and divergence indicates that
some correlation of cognitive and defensive change is expectable, with divergence
centering mainly on those areas where defenses are operating at a more unconscious
and emotional level.
Summary
The existing literature supports cognition and defenses as intrapsychic correlates of
symptom reduction, with better evidence that cognitive change precedes and predicts
symptom change (but may not be speciﬁc to cognitive therapy). Effect sizes for the
association of cognitive change to reduction in depression were generally large, and
the association of defense change ranged from medium to large effects, mostly of
changes in immature defenses.
The current study advances cognitive, psychodynamic, and trans-theoretical
research in several ways. First, this study includes both psychodynamic and cognitive
perspectives, allowing further trans-theoretical exploration of these mechanisms of
change. Second, three time points are used, permitting a test of full or partial
temporal precedence. Third, the study drew depressed participants from the
community, allowing examination of intrapsychic mechanisms in untreated
depression as well as treated depression. The inclusion of untreated participants
allows a test of a non-speciﬁcity hypothesis: that change in defenses and cognitions
should predict change in mood, regardless of treatment status.
Research Questions and Analyses
Changes in cognition and defenses are hypothesized to be mechanisms related to
depressive symptoms, regardless of an individual’s treatment status. Assuming at
least a partial common pathway of symptom reduction, the intra-psychic
mechanisms of distorted thinking and immature defenses should be present in the
natural history of untreated depression as well as treated depression, and in patients
receiving different types of treatment. The sample includes both treated and
untreated participants, but because those who received treatment received a mix of
psychotherapies and medications, this study does not offer conclusions about the
effect of speciﬁc treatments.
In addition, this sample of lower SES participants with recurrent depression
differs from the higher SES, single episode depression participants found in many
clinical trials (Morrison, Bradley, & Westen, 2003), making possible a test of the
generalizability of clinical trial based mechanism research.
The primary research question is: Does early mechanism change predict later
symptom change? The ﬁrst analysis examines the correlation of changes in time-one
to time-two automatic thoughts, immature and mature defenses, to time-two to timethree depression and general psychiatric symptoms. This ﬁrst test provides full
temporal precedence. The second analysis relaxes temporal precedence, correlating
time-one to time-two automatic thoughts, immature and mature defenses, to timeone to time-three depression and psychiatric symptoms. The rationale for the relaxed
temporal precedence analysis rests in the exploratory, hypothesis generating nature
of this study. It is acknowledged in the design of this study that sample size, and the
Journal of Clinical Psychology
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inclusion of untreated participants who may experience little symptom change, might
not allow the power to show a difference in the most rigorous test including full
temporal precedence. The results from the full temporal precedence tests should be
given more weight than those from relaxed partial temporal precedence analysis.
Follow-up analyses test the directionality of inﬂuence by examining the
correlation of early symptom change to later defense and automatic thought
change, using both full and relaxed temporal precedence models.
Methods
Design
This study utilized a repeated measures survey design, drawing a sample of depressed
adults from the community. An initial phone screen with a structured diagnostic
interview was followed by three paper and pencil questionnaires spaced approximately 6 weeks apart. Participants were paid $10 for each paper and pencil survey
returned. The Institutional Review Board at Portland State University reviewed and
approved the human subject protocol for this study.
Sampling and Procedures
Participants were drawn from the greater Portland Oregon metropolitan area.
Recruitment was conducted through posting ﬂyers, advertising in community
papers, and posting on local Internet classiﬁeds. Potential participants contacted the
researchers via telephone or e-mail. A focused clinical diagnostic interview was
conducted in the telephone screening using the depression sections of the Mini
International Neuropsychiatric Interview-5 (MINI-5; Lecrubier et al., 1997).
Participants were offered participation if they met criteria for a DSM-IV depression
diagnosis with current depressive symptoms and, if in treatment of any kind, the
treatment had started in the past 2 months.
Telephone screens were conducted with 83 participants, four of which were
identiﬁed as possibly having subclinical depressive symptoms and one as possibly
being an unreliable reporter of symptoms. These ﬁve were offered the opportunity to
complete the ﬁrst paper and pencil questionnaire to provide further information for
making a decision on inclusion in the study. Four of the ﬁve were judged appropriate
for continuing in the study. Sixty-ﬁve participants completed time-one questionnaires. There were no differences between the 65 responders and the 18 nonresponders on any of the variables collected in the phone screen.
There was no attrition at time-two, but six participants did not complete timethree questionnaires. A conservative strategy was used, substituting time-two scores
for the missing time-three scores for these six participants, resulting in an analysis
sample of 65. The mean lag time between the time-one survey and the time-three
survey was 12.6 weeks (SD 5 4). The lag time was not associated with any of the
variables of interest.
Of the 65 participants, 71% were women (n 5 46) and 77% were white (n 5 50).
The average age was 41.7 years (SD 5 14.4). Approximately half of the participants
(52.3%) reported currently being from a lower income socioeconomic status (n 5 34)
and 60% had some college education (n 5 39). The vast majority of the sample met
criteria for a current major depressive episode (n 5 60; 92.3%) and two-thirds met
criteria for recurrent major depression (n 5 43; 66%). Twenty-ﬁve met criteria for
dysthymic disorder (39%), with 23 of these meeting DSM-IV criteria for ‘‘double
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depression’’ (lifetime dysthymic disorder preceding ﬁrst major depressive episode).
Forty-one (63%) reported a previous history of diagnosis and treatment for a mood
or anxiety disorder.
Out of the 65 participants in the analysis sample, 30 (46%) received some form of
treatment for depression during the course of the study (took psychiatric
medications or attended at least one therapy session). Sixteen (24%) were prescribed
psychiatric medication, and twenty-one (32%) were in psychotherapy. Seven
participants (11%) were receiving both therapy and psychiatric medication.
Medications were prescribed by a primary care provider for nearly half of those
receiving medication (n 5 7). For those for whom antidepressant prescription data
were available, seven participants were receiving an SSRI antidepressant and four an
atypical antidepressant (Welbutrin). At time-one, the 30 participants receiving
treatment had started this treatment an average of 2.9 weeks earlier (SD 5 3.3). The
time since treatment start was not correlated with time-one BDI or BSI. No further
information was available to judge the quality, frequency, or the theoretical
orientation of the psychotherapies.
Measures
Automatic thoughts were measured using the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire
(ATQ), a measure of negative automatic thoughts about the self. The scale has
excellent internal consistency with an alpha of .97 (Hollon & Kendall, 1980). The six
highest loading items in previous published factor analyses were selected for use in
this study, achieving very good reliability (a 5 .91). (All of the reliabilities reported
for this study are the average Cronbach’s a across the three time points).
Mature and immature defenses were measured with the Defense Style Questionnaire
(DSQ), a measure of conscious derivatives of unconscious defense mechanisms. The
DSQ showed good convergent validity with other defense measures, including observer
rated defenses (Bond et al., 1989). Published reliability of the two subscales used in this
study were good (a 5 .68 for mature and a 5 .80 for immature; Andrews, Singh, &
Bond, 1993). The highest loading items tapping mature and immature defenses were
selected from previous published factor analyses, resulting in two six-item scales. The
individual defenses in the immature scale were autistic fantasy, displacement, passiveaggression, projection, and somatization. The mature defenses assessed were
anticipation, humor, sublimation, and suppression. Adequate to good reliability was
observed in this sample (a 5 .69 for mature and a 5 .74 for immature).
General psychiatric symptom severity was measured with the Brief Symptom
Inventory (BSI), a 53-item version of the 90-item Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL-90).
In both short and long forms, this scale is a widely used outcome measure designed
to tap a range of psychiatric symptoms. The published internal reliability coefﬁcients
for the nine BSI subscales range from .71 to .85, and test-retest reliability for the
whole scale is .90 (Derogatis, 1993). The overall reliability achieved in this study for
the 53 BSI items was excellent (a 5 .96).
Depression was measured with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The BDI
has extensive reliability and validity evidence (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).
Reliability in this study for the BDI was very good (a 5 .87).
Analysis
Power analysis found that this study (N 5 65) has the power to detect a large
association (r 5 .50) of change mechanisms to change in symptoms (Cohen, 1988).
Journal of Clinical Psychology
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The study was adequately powered to detect the expectable effect of cognitive change
to depression and marginally powered to detect the expectable relationship of
defense change to depression.
Treated and untreated groups were examined for mean differences on the variables of
interest. Regression residualized change score variables were calculated for the BDI, the
BSI, automatic thoughts, and immature and mature defenses. Scores were computed for
time-one to time-two, time-two to time-three, and time-one to time-three. Residual
change scores are superior to subtractive change scores in being less vulnerable to
extreme scores at either pre- or post-test and provide better reliability (Cronbach &
Furby, 1970). Malgady and Colon-Malgady (1991) provide a formula for calculating the
reliability of residualized change scores from pre-and post-test reliabilities and the
correlation of the pre- and post-test. The greater the correlation of the pre- and post-test,
the greater likelihood that error is concentrated in the change score, attenuating the
reliability achieved in the pre- and post-test. The reliability of the change scores was good
to very good, with the exception of the reliability for the immature defense change scores
(a 5 .62) and poor reliability for the mature defense change scores (a 5 .38). The
immature defense change score was retained despite marginal reliability, but the mature
defense change score was not used in further analysis due to poor reliability.
The residualized change scores were entered into full and relaxed temporal precedence
correlation analyses, as stated in the research questions section. The retention of a
marginal reliability immature defense change variable, and the relaxed temporal
precedence tests are appropriate to a hypothesis generating study in an emergent area
of study. Where meaningful, the statistical signiﬁcance of differences in correlation
coefﬁcients was tested, using the equation for the difference of two dependent correlations
(Chen & Popovich, 2002, pp. 23–25). The difference between the association of early
mechanism change with symptom change and early symptom change with mechanism
change could not be tested due to the variables not matching any known formula for
signiﬁcance testing (correlations of unique pairs of variables on the same sample).

Results
There were no differences in age, gender, or ethnicity of those who received
treatment and those who did not. The participants in the treatment group were 1.9
times more likely to have a history of previous treatment (w2 (1, N 5 65) 5 4.42,
po.05). The treated and untreated subsamples were compared with time-one, timethree, and change time-one to time-three of automatic thoughts, immature and
mature defenses, and BDI and BSI scores. No signiﬁcant mean differences were
found between the treatment group and the no treatment group, except that the no
treatment group showed a greater decrease in immature defenses from time-one to
time-three (t(61) 5 2.02, p 5 .04, Cohen’s d 5 .51). Because the groups did not differ
on the majority of variables of interest, they were aggregated for all further analyses.
The means and standard deviations at each time point are presented in Table 1.
The mean BDI score at time-one exceeded the cut-off for severe depression (Beck
et al., 1996). The BSI score was also elevated, with the observed mean score one-half
of a standard deviation above the mean of 1,002 outpatients (Derogatis, 1993).
A statistically signiﬁcant mean change was observed in both the BDI and the BSI,
with a medium-size half standard deviation change on the BDI and a small
one-quarter standard deviation change on the BSI (Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for
Cohen’s d: about .2 is small/weak; about .50 is medium/moderate; about .80 large/
Journal of Clinical Psychology
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Table 1
Comparison of Time 1 (Baseline), Time 2 (5-Weeks), and Time 3 (10-Weeks) Change
Mechanism and Symptom Scores
Time 1
Variable
Automatic thoughts
Immature defenses
Mature defenses
Beck Depression
Inventory
Brief Symptom
Inventory

M

Time 2

SD

M

Time 3

SD

M

Paired t tests

SD

T1 vs. T2

T1 vs. T3

2.03 (.20)
1.65 (.18)
2.10 ( .24)
3.55 (.32)

3.38 (.39)
1.58 (.24)
2.36 ( .27)
5.31 (.49)

1.42 (.21)

2.60 (.27)

3.37
5.27
4.84
29.42

1.06
1.48
1.47
11.43

3.16
4.99
5.19
25.62

1.04
1.59
1.46
12.34

2.94
4.89
5.22
23.41

1.14
4.62
1.37
13.06

1.67

.66

1.57

.09

1.47

.80

Note. M 5 mean; SD 5 standard deviation; Cohen’s d statistic is reported in parentheses in the paired t test
columns. N 5 65.
po.05; po.01; po.001.

strong). As noted above, the treatment group did not differ from those not receiving
treatment in decrease in symptoms across the study.
Ninety-ﬁve percent of the sample scored in the clinical range on the BSI and BDI at
time-one. At time-three, four of ﬁve subjects still scored in the clinical range on at
least one measure. Although the majority of subjects continued to have clinical level
of symptoms at the end of this study, approximately half of participants had reliable
decreases in symptoms. Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) Reliable Change Index (RCI)
gives the threshold amount of change where we can be conﬁdent at the .05 level that
the change is not due to measurement error. RCI calculations used followed Barkham
et al. (1996), Barkham, Rees, Stiles, Hardy, and Shapiro (2002) for the BDI, and used
normative data from Derogatis (1993) for the BSI. Using the RCI, 46% of
participants had reliable decrease in symptoms on the BSI and 50% on the BDI.
The mean changes in cognition, immature and mature defenses were all modest
across the three time points. The changes were largest for automatic thoughts,
followed by mature defenses (both statistically signiﬁcant). The one-quarter of a
standard deviation change in immature defenses was not statistically signiﬁcant.
Age, sex, ethnicity, medication status, and therapy status had no relationship to the
variables of interest. Time-one to time-three changes in automatic thoughts were
moderately correlated with changes in immature defenses at (r 5 .37, po.01). Changes
in mature defenses were not related to changes in immature defenses or cognition.
The top section of Table 2 shows the most rigorous test, with early mechanism
change predicting later symptom change. No signiﬁcant relationships were found.
The lower part of Table 2 presents the results of the test of change mechanisms and
symptom change allowing partial temporal overlap (time-one to time-two change
mechanisms association with time-one to time-three symptoms). Change in
automatic thoughts was moderately to strongly correlated with decreased symptoms
on both the BSI and the BDI. Change in immature defenses was moderately
correlated with decreased symptoms on both outcome measures (Cohen’s (1988)
guidelines for Pearson’s r: about .10 is weak/small; about .30 is moderate/medium;
about .50 is strong/large). Change in mature defenses was not associated with either
outcome measure. The difference between the automatic thoughts-BDI correlation
(r 5 .48) and the immature defenses-BDI correlation (r 5 .27) was statistically
signiﬁcant (t(62) 5 2.0, po.05).
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Table 2
Tests of Relationship of Change in Cognition and Defenses to Symptom Change
Most rigorous test—time-one to time-two change mechanisms predicting time-two to time-three symptom
scores (temporal precedence of change mechanisms and symptom change)
Dependent variables

Independent variables

T2–T3 BDI

T2–T3 BSI

Pearson’s r

Pearson’s r

T1–T2 AUTO
T1–T2 IMMA

.10
.14

.12
.02

Less rigorous test—time-one to time-two change mechanisms predicting time-one to time-three symptom
scores (partially cross-sectional)
Dependent variables
T1–T3 BDI
Pearson’s r

Independent variables

T1–T3 BSI
Pearson’s r

.48
.27

T1-T2 AUTO
T1-T2 IMMA

.41
.38

Note. AUTO 5 automatic thoughts; IMMA 5 immature defenses; BDI 5 Beck Depression Inventory;
BSI 5 Brief Symptom Inventory. N 5 65.
po.05; po.01; po.001.

Table 3
Tests of Relationship of Change in Symptoms to Change in Cognition and Defenses
Most rigorous test—time-one to time-two symptom scores predicting time-two to time-three change
mechanisms (temporal precedence)
Dependent variables

Independent variables
T1–T2 BDI
T1–T2 BSI

T2–T3 AUTO

T2–T3 IMMA

Pearson’s r

Pearson’s r

.08
.01

.08
.29

Less rigorous test—time-one to time-two symptom scores predicting time-one to time-three change
mechanisms (partially cross-sectional)
Dependent variables
T1–T3 AUTO
Pearson’s r

Independent variables

.27
.28

T1–T2 BDI
T1–T2 BSI

T1–T3 IMMA
Pearson’s r
.31
.51

Note. AUTO 5 automatic thoughts; IMMA 5 immature defenses; BDI 5 Beck Depression Inventory;
BSI 5 Brief Symptom Inventory. N 5 65.
po.05; po.01; po.001.

Table 3 shows the follow-up test of directionality: Does early symptom change
predict changes in defenses and automatic thoughts? The most rigorous test found
one signiﬁcant relationship: Early decrease in BSI scores was moderately correlated
with subsequent decreases in immature defenses. The test with relaxed temporal
Journal of Clinical Psychology
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order found that early changes in symptoms had a medium size association with
decreased automatic thoughts, and early changes in symptoms had a medium to
large association with decreased immature defenses. Early change in symptoms was
not associated with change in mature defenses. There was a non-signiﬁcant trendlevel difference between the BSI- immature defenses correlation (r 5 .51) and the
BSI- automatic thoughts correlation (r 5 .28); t(62) 5 1.86, po.10).
Discussion
The treatment and no treatment groups were comparable in demographics, and no
group differences were evident in mental health symptoms over the course of the
study. The treatment group in this study is equivalent to a treatment as usual (TAU)
comparison group sometimes used in clinical trials- the nature, quality and intensity
of treatment is likely highly variable (van de Wiel et al., 2007). The modest,
signiﬁcant decrease in symptoms over the course of the study for both treated and
untreated participants likely reﬂects a number of factors, including regression to the
mean and a small treatment effect of the two telephone contacts and completing the
questionnaires. This sample largely comprises people with recurrent major
depression, with severe symptoms, and from lower SES. The sample is markedly
different than participants usually enrolled in clinical trials, offering a test of the
generalizability of the existing mechanism of change evidence.
The results indicate that changes in immature defenses occur simultaneously with,
or after, symptom change: The only signiﬁcant relationship found in the full
temporal precedence tests was of early BSI change predicting later decrease in
immature defenses, and, the correlations of symptom change to defense change were
larger than defense change to symptom change (as noted in methods, the difference
in these correlations could not be tested).
Change in cognitions is associated with symptom change, with some indication
that cognitive change predicts symptom change: The automatic thoughts full
temporal precedence tests found no signiﬁcant relationships, but in the relaxed
temporal precedence tests, the correlations were larger for early change in automatic
thoughts association with change in symptoms, than those for early change in
symptoms association with automatic thoughts.
The different patterns found for cognitive change and defense change was
reinforced in that the correlation of cognitive change to symptom change was
signiﬁcantly larger than that of immature defense change to symptom change.
The pattern found for automatic thoughts is consistent with ﬁndings from
previous studies that showed changes in cognition predicted symptom change
(DeRubeis et al., 1990; Kwon & Oei, 2003; Coleman, 2005). The change in cognition
from time-one to time-two was relatively small (.2 of a standard deviation), but it
had a strong association with symptom change across the three time points. This
provides further evidence for the potency of cognitions as a change mechanism:
A small early change in cognition has a strong association with larger change in
symptoms.
Review articles note the consistent ﬁnding of cognitive change associated with
decreased symptoms, but also converge in ﬁnding that cognitive change is not
speciﬁc to cognitive therapy (Oei & Free, 1995; Whisman, 1999; Garratt et al., 2007).
This current study adds to the evidence that cognitive change predicts symptom
change, and that this is not a treatment speciﬁc effect. The fact that cognitive change
was equally an active ingredient in the untreated group suggests cognition is a factor
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in spontaneous amelioration or remission of symptoms, as well as treatment induced
remission.
As Kazdin (2007) points out, there is no clear evidence that speciﬁc therapy
processes, or therapist techniques, are related to changing cognition. It is likely there
are numerous direct and indirect pathways of therapy processes to cognitive change.
However, it is logical that direct discussion of thoughts (such as in CBT), and
exploratory techniques that elicit whole networks of thoughts about the self and
others (such as in interpersonal therapy or psychodynamic therapy) will inﬂuence
cognition.
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, used to measure cognition in this and
many other studies, comprises stark, negative phrases about the self and one’s life. It
is not surprising that thoughts of this kind change in different treatments, and even
in untreated depression. For researchers, more sophisticated and subtle means of
measuring cognition should be explored. The need to develop, or to transfer from
laboratory psychology, measures of cognition that are not self-report based is
gaining recognition among cognitive researchers (Garratt et al., 2007; Haubert &
Dobson, 2007; Hollon, Thase, & Markowitz, 2002). Some of the methodology of
projective psychodynamic techniques could be employed for new cognitive measures.
An example is Barton, Morley, Bloxham, Kitson, and Platts (2005) sentence
completion test to measure depression from a cognitive perspective. Although the
participant provides the sentence completions, the sentences are scored for
depressive content by a rater.
The association of decreases in immature defenses with decreases in symptoms was
modest and the evidence indicates change in symptoms precedes change in defenses.
In contrast to cognitive theory, psychodynamic theory and research does not clearly
designate defense change as a mechanism of symptom reduction. Some preceding
studies, such as Albucher et al. (1998), made the assumption that symptom change
predicts defense change. Hersoug et al. (2002) also found that symptom change
preceded change in defenses. One possible pattern for defense change is that use of
immature defenses will drop early in treatment as the patient stabilizes from an
initial regressive crisis. Although defenses show plasticity with the ebb and ﬂow of
depression, they are also a more stable personality level phenomenon. It is logical
that characterological or structural change would occur later in treatment. Research
with more measurement points may be able to show the interplay of defenses and
symptoms over time.
This is only the second study to analyze both measures of cognitions and
defenses. The moderate correlation of changes in automatic thoughts and immature
defenses was almost identical to that found in Coleman (2005). The earlier study,
with only two time points and using the BSI as the outcome variable, found a similar
pattern of relationship of changes in automatic thoughts, defenses, and symptom
change. The partial independence of immature defense change and cognitive change
suggests that the two theories are each picking up something unique in the
intrapsychic process of depressed adults. Larger sample studies will be able to
provide multivariate tests to partial out the unique effects of defense and cognitive
change.
For clinicians, techniques or clinical processes that shift immature defenses or
depressive cognitions are supported by these results. In particular, changes in
automatic thoughts had strong and broad effects. Clinicians should consider
integrating attention to automatic thoughts into treatment. Some process research
suggests that psychodynamic clinicians already include work on cognitions. Ablon
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and Jones (1998) found that the therapy process of manualized PT was correlated
with both ideal, expert-generated PT and CBT process prototypes.
A quote from McWilliams (2005) theoretically integrates psychodynamic and
cognitive processes, noting the importance of the emotional working-through grief
but also stating: ‘‘It is also critical to help them understand the cognitive dimensions
of their unconscious experience, namely their childhood conclusion that it was their
own badness that provoked their misfortune y.’’ (p. 100). This study is a step
towards reﬂecting in research the theoretical and clinical integration of McWilliams’
statement.
The limitations of self-report measurement and few measurement points were
noted earlier. In addition, the use of change scores compounds any unreliability in
the pre- and post-test scores. This problem is reduced, but not eliminated, by the use
of residualized change scores. The mature defense change scores were not reliable,
and reliability was problematic for immature defenses, reducing the power to detect
relationships between constructs. In addition, this study was adequately powered to
ﬁnd large effects, and the literature suggests medium effects are reasonable to expect
for the relation of defense change to symptoms. In the relaxed temporal order
analyses, it is impossible to isolate cross-sectional associations from those across
time-points. The absence of information about the treatments provided to the
treated subsample also limits interpretation of the results.
Strengths of this study are as follows: diagnostic homogeneity determined by
structured clinical interview; inclusion of treated and untreated depression; and
adequate time-points to model temporal order. The sample provides diversity
compared with most clinical trials, conﬁrming the relationship of change
mechanisms to symptoms in a different population than earlier studies.
The clinical trial movement in psychotherapy research has done much to
demonstrate the efﬁcacy of psychotherapy. Clinical trials, however, often ‘‘black
box’’ how or why therapy works. Mechanism of change research gets inside the black
box and tests if treatments work as theorized. This study provides further evidence
that change in cognition is an active ingredient in reducing symptoms and
preliminary evidence that immature defense change is simultaneous to, or follows,
symptom change. Other studies that include multiple theory-based change
mechanisms into single studies may stimulate the development of research-based
hybrid therapies. Multitheoretical research could assist the mental health ﬁeld to
move past partisan theoretical divisions, and research-based hybrid therapies may be
one pathway to exceed the efﬁcacy of current treatments.
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